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Abstract 
The Ethiopian Federation which was created by the 1995 Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia (FDRE) Constitution had nine member states and one city 
administration. Apart from the creation of Dire Dawa as a city administration, no 
new state has been introduced in the Ethiopian federation since the adoption of the 
Constitution. However, several ethnic-based Zonal administrations in the country‟s 
Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples (SNNP) region are now demanding to 
form their own regional states. Apparently, the demands are justified under Article 
47(2) of the 1995 Ethiopian constitution which follows a purely ethnic-centered 
approach by giving “each nation, nationality and people” living in the nine States of 
the federation “the right to establish their own States at any time.” However, since 
this right has so far never been exercised in practice, the new demands are creating 
anxiety in some quarters and drawing a growing attention to the constitutional 
procedure for the creation of new states. This article aims to critically examine the 
relevant constitutional provisions dealing with the issue of creation of new states. 
Drawing insights from some other federations, we argue that the ethnic-centered 
approach taken under the FDRE Constitution for the creation of new states 
overlooks several important issues such as economic viability, administrative 
efficiency, equity, sustainable peace, and resilience of the federal system. 
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Introduction 
Federations have constituent units with substantial legislative, executive and 
judicial power. The numbers of these component units, however, vary from one 
federation to the other and are not necessarily proportional to the landmass or 
the population size of the country. For example, India, a Federation of more 
than 1 billion people, has 29 states and seven union territories1, while 
Switzerland, a country of about 8 million people, has 26 cantons. The United 
States has 50 states (plus two federacies), three local home-rule territories and 
three unincorporated territories; Australia has six states (plus four administered 
territories, three territories and one capital territory; Canada has ten provinces 
(plus two territories); Malaysia has 13 states, and Nigeria has 36 states.2 
Some federations have shown relative stability in the number of their 
constituent units. For example, apart from the creation of Jura as a separate 
canton in 1979, the number of cantons in Switzerland remained stable since 
1848.3 By contrast, the territorial boundaries of other federations have gone 
through frequent changes. For example, a series of state creation exercises in 
Nigeria and India brought about numerous new states. Beginning with three 
regions prior to the Nigerian Civil War (1966-70), the Nigerian Federation grew 
to 36 states by 1996.4 India, on its part, which was reorganized in 1956 into 13 
states5 has now 29 states.6  
The Ethiopian Federation which was created by its 1995 constitution had 
nine member states7 and one city administration.8 Apart from the creation of 
                                           
Frequently used acronyms: 
FDRE 
NNP 
Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia 
Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
SNNP Southern Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
1
 <http://www.india.gov.in/india-glance/profile> [Last accessed on July 19, 2019]. 
2
 See R.A. Akindele (2001), „Nigeria in the Global Market of Experiments in Federalism,‟ 
in J.I. Elaigwu and R.A. Akindele (eds.) Foundations of Nigerian Federalism. 1960-1995, 
National Council on Intergovernmental Relations, Abuja, at p. 13.   
3
 See T.K. Reuter (2016), “The Right to Self-Determination of Ethnic Groups: The Canton 
of Jura in Switzerland”, International Journal on Minority and Group Rights, Vol. 23 No. 
2, p. 260. 
4
 See Adewale Stephen Adeniyi (2004), “Quest for State‟s Creation in Nigeria: an Harbinger 
of Development or Underdevelopment?”, Journal of Culture, Society and Development, 
Vol.4, at p. 68.   
5
 See The States Reorganisation Act, 1956, Section 12. 
6
 Supra note 1. 
7
 See the Constitution of the Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, 1995, Federal 
Negarit Gazeta, Proc. No. 1/1995, No.1, 1st year 1995 (Hereinafter: FDRE Constitution), 
Article 47(1).  
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Dire Dawa as a city administration which is accountable to the Federal 
Government by a Federal proclamation9, in the more than two decades of the 
Constitution‟s existence, no new regional state has been introduced in the 
Ethiopian federation. This might be surprising considering the Constitution‟s 
clear declaration that each nation, nationality and people has the right to form its 
own state.10 
However, it appears that the relative stability the federation has witnessed so 
far in terms of the number of its member states is likely to change soon. Several 
ethnic-based Zonal administrations in the Southern Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples‟ Region (SNNPR) are now demanding to form their own regional 
states.11 Against this background, this article aims to critically examine the 
constitutional procedure for the creation of new states in Ethiopia.   
Before delving into the details of the constitutional procedure for the creation 
of new states, the first section of this article deals with the FDRE Constitution‟s 
general orientation that conceives Ethiopia as a consent-based marriage of its 
diverse ethnic groups. It is argued that this ethnic-centered orientation is what 
shapes and informs the main features of the Ethiopian federalism, including the 
procedure for state creation. The second section of the article presents and 
analyzes the constitutional procedure for the creation of new states as enshrined 
in Article 47 of the Constitution as one of the aspects of the ethnic-centered 
                                                                                                            
8
 According to Article 49(2) of the FDRE Constitution “[r]esidents of Addis Ababa shall 
have a full measure of self-government.” Sub-article 3 of the same provision further states 
that “[t]he Administration of Addis Ababa shall be responsible to the Federal 
Government.”  
9
 The recognition of Dire Dawa as a city accountable to the Federal Government was a 
temporary arrangement until such a time that the then claims of the Somalia and Oromia 
regions would finally be resolved.See the Preamble of Dire Dawa Administration Charter 
Proclamation, 2004, Federal Negarit Gazeta, Proc. No. 416/2004, 10
th
 year, No. 60, 2004. 
Since the FDRE Constitution did not as such talk about any city accountable to the Federal 
government other than Addis Ababa, some writers rightly note that the DireDawa situation 
can be characterized as an instance of “constitutional amendment by legislation.” See 
Nigussie Afesha (2016), “The Practice of Informal Changes to the Ethiopian Constitution 
in the Course of Application”, Mizan Law Review, Vol. 10, No. 2, at p. 387.  
10
 See Article 47(2) of FDRE Constitution. 
11
 “Demands for Regional Status Rock Ethiopia‟s South Region”, 7Dnews, 
https://7dnews.com/news/deamds-forregional-status-rock-ethiopia-s-south-region[last 
accessed on March 27, 2019];  Brook Abdu, Sidama‟s Quest for Statehood, The Reporter, 
10 November 2018, https://www.thereporterethiopia.com/article/sidamas-quest-
statehood[last accessed on March 27, 2019]. Sidama‟s quest for regional statehood is in 
particular at advanced stage as a date for referendum is already fixed for November 13, 
2019. https://www.africanews.com/2019/08/29/ethiopia-slates-november-13-for-sidama-
autonomy-referendum//. 
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nature of the Ethiopian Federalism. This ethnic-centered orientation is 
manifested in the content of the procedure for creation of constituent units that 
solely gives the power to the ethnic group that raises the question.  
In Section 3, the ethnic-centered approach in Ethiopia‟s constitution is 
contrasted with the procedures adopted for the creation of new constituent units 
in some other federations. To this end, the section presents an overview of the 
constitutional procedure for creation of new States in several federations, and 
further includes a closer look into the history and procedures of state creation in 
two selected federations, Nigeria and India. These countries are chosen because 
both countries are ethnically diverse, and agitations for the creation of new 
states in both countries have over the years led to the introduction of new federal 
units. Based on the analysis of the procedure for the creation of new states in the 
FDRE constitution and the insights drawn from the examination of the 
experiences of other countries, some important issues that are overlooked in the 
Ethiopian constitutional arrangement are discussed in Section 4.  
1. The 1995 FDRE Constitution: Reconceiving Ethiopia as a 
Marriage of its Ethnic Groups    
Ethiopia is one of the oldest States in Africa with a unique history.12 At the 
beginning of the 20th century, it was one of the few countries in Africa that was 
not under colonial rule. This image of an old and proud Ethiopia13 is however 
far from being uncontroversial. Depending on their historiographic paradigm, 
different people associate different, sometimes conflicting, images with 
Ethiopia.14 The tension between these competing paradigms is the driving force 
in some of the constitutional changes and the resulting transformations in the 
political organization the country has gone through in the 20th century.  
Although historical Ethiopia can actually be described as a de facto federal 
state,15 three of the four modern written constitutions of Ethiopia were unitarist 
                                           
12
 Ethiopia is widely believed to be the birth place of mankind, and as such, there is a long 
history of human habitation in what we now call Ethiopia. See Harold Marcus (1994), A 
History of Ethiopia, Berkeley, University of California Press, pp.1-17.  
13
 Though Ethiopia existed as a state for many centuries, it did exist in different shapes and 
sizes, sometimes expanding while shrinking at other times. See Getachew Assefa (2012), 
Ethiopian Constitutional Law with comparative Notes and Materials: A Textbook, Addis 
Ababa University, Addis Ababa, at p. 253. 
14
 Teshale Tibebu identifies different sometimes conflicting images associated with Ethiopia 
including “Christian Ethiopia”, “Semetic Ethiopia”, “the Authentic African Ethiopia”, 
“the black colonial power Ethiopia” etc. See Teshale Tibebu (1996), “Ethiopia: The 
“Anomaly” and “Paradox” of Africa,” Journal of Black Studies, Vol. 26, No. 4, at p. 427. 
15
 Assefa Feseha (2006), Federalism and the Accommodation of Diversity in Ethiopia: a 
Comparative Study, Wolf Legal Publishers, the Netherlands, 2006, at p. 16.  
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in their orientation. Ethiopia‟s first written constitution was introduced 1931 by 
Emperor Haile Selassie I, and it gave a modern image to the old monarchical 
system.16 The 1931 Constitution proclaimed that “in the Ethiopian Empire, 
supreme power rested in the hands of the Emperor.”17 It was practically used by 
the Emperor as a means of facilitating the centralization of power in his hands.18 
The 1931 Constitution was revised in 1955. The revision was largely 
necessitated by the Federation of Eritrea with Ethiopia in 1952.19 The fact that 
Eritrea possessed a Constitution far more modern than Ethiopia‟s pushed the 
Emperor, who was very sensitive to international opinion, to give a blessing for 
the revision of the 1931 Constitution.20 Despite the creation of a bicameral 
parliament and the introduction of some progressive changes21, in the 1955 
Revised Constitution, the sovereignty of the Empire was still vested in the 
Emperor and “the supreme authority over all the affairs of the Empire” was 
“exercised by Him.”22 Due to its centralizing mission and apparent 
incompatibility with the rather democratic 1952 Constitution of Eritrea23, the 
Revised constitution appears to have contributed for the subsequent dissolution 
of the Federation in 1962. 
The unitary system of government continued after the revolution of 1974 that 
replaced the monarchical government. The military junta ruled Ethiopia as a 
provisional government for more than ten years.  The 1987 Constitution of 
Ethiopia, which was adopted four years before the fall of Derg in 1991, adopted 
a unitary form of government.24 Article 2(1) of the 1987 PDRE (Peoples‟ 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia) Constitution declared: “The Peoples‟ 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia is a unitary state in which all nationalities live 
                                           
16
 See John Markakis and Asmelash Beyene (1967), “Representative Institutions in 
Ethiopia,” Journal of Modern African Studies, Vol. 5, No.2, pp. 193-217 partly 
reproduced in Getachew Assefa, supra note 13, at p. 261. 
17
 See Article 6 of the 1931 Constitution. 
18
 See John Markakis and Asmelash Beyene,supra note 16, at p. 263. 
19
 See Assefa Fisseha, supra note 15, at p.38. 
20
 See Markakis and Asmelash, supra note 18. 
21
 For a very positive view regarding the contribution and the qualities of the 1955 Revised 
Constitution, see in general Minassie Haile (2005), “Comparing Human Rights in Two 
Ethiopian Constitutions: The Emperor‟s and the “Republic‟s”-Cucullus Non Facit 
Monachum”, Cardozo J. Int’L and Comparative Law, Vol. 13, pp. 1-59.   
22
 See Article 26 of the Revised Constitution of 1955. For an overview on the Revised 
Constitution, See William H. Lewis (1956). “Documents: Ethiopia‟s Revised 
Constitution”, Middle East Journal, Vol. 10, No. 2, pp. 194-199.   
23
 See Assefa Fisseha, supra note 15, at p. 44. 
24
 See the Constitution of the People‟s Democratic Republic of Ethiopia, Proclamation No. 
1 of 1987, Negarit Gazetta, Vol. 47, No. 1, Addis Ababa, 12 September 1987. 
[hereinafter: PDRE Constitution] 
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in equality.” Despite adopting a unitary form of government, the Constitution 
noted that the state will be comprised of “administrative and autonomous 
regions”25 and that it “shall ensure equality of all nationalities”26 and “regional 
autonomy”.27 However, the power “to establish administrative and autonomous 
regions and determine their boundary, level of hierarchy and accountability” 
was given to the National Shengo, the highest political organ in the PDRE.28 
Due to its socialist orientation, the Constitution defined the People‟s 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia as “a State of the working people founded on 
the alliance of workers and peasants and the participation of the intelligentsia, 
the revolutionary army, artisans and other democratic sections of society.”29 
Although the equality of all nations is repeatedly affirmed in the PDRE 
Constitution, the various ethnic groups of Ethiopia were not as such conceived 
as the original contractors of the constitutional arrangement.   
The overthrow of the Derg regime in 1991, marked an end of a unitarist era 
in Ethiopian political history and brought what is usually called the “nationality 
question” to the forefront. The change, which coincided with the disintegration 
of Yugoslavia and the USSR brought the Ethiopian Peoples‟ Revolutionary 
Front (EPRDF) to power. The unitarist bureaucratic structure including the 
national army was dismantled and replaced by EPRDF leadership; and a new 
national army composed of the former rebel fighters was created. The years 
prior to the adoption of the FDRE Constitution in 1995 were dominated by 
nationalist movements.30 
                                           
25
 Ibid, Article 59. 
26
 Ibid, Article 2(2).  
27
 Ibid, Article 2(4).  
28
 Ibid, Article 63(2)(a).  
29
 Ibid, Article 1(1).  
30
 Writing in 1993 Andreas Eshete captured the situation at the time in the following words: 
“The answer to the question of whether Ethiopian citizens will effectively exercise their 
rights has complicated another challenge that the country presently faces. The struggle 
against authoritarian power has prompted the various nationalist movements. The most 
powerful organizations are animated by ardent nationalist sentiments. All the groups who 
participated in the July 1991 conference endorsed the collective rights in the charter, 
which reserves large powers to cultural communities. Since then, the transitional 
government issued a proclamation on the establishment of regions and regional 
governments. A striking feature of the statute is that it defines regions almost exclusively 
by reference to ethnic identity. If the statute is upheld by the new constitution, Ethiopia 
will become a federation of self-governing ethnic communities” Andreas Eshete (1993), 
“Implementing Human Rights and a Democratic Constitution in Ethiopia”, Issue: A 
Journal of Opinion, Vol. 21, No. 1/2, at p. 10.    
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As a result, just like in the Transitional Period31, the 1995 FDRE Constitution 
continued to define the regional states by reference to ethnic identity. From a 
conceptual standpoint, the 1995 constitution practically reorganized the 
Ethiopian state. The reorganization occurred in the form of a total shift from the 
unitarist tendencies of the previous regimes. In this regard, Andreas Eshete 
noted that “although the Ethiopian Federalism was born in the wake of a long-
standing unitary state, the constitutional principles governing federalism 
exemplifies features of coming-together federalism.”32 Andreas did not however 
consider the self-image of the political order that the FDRE Constitution created 
as a coming-together federalism as a mere constitutional fiction. That is 
because, on the one hand, with either defeat or exile of multinational political 
organizations, the main political actors in the Transitional Period were 
representatives of ethnic groups.33 Besides, in Tigray, for example, the struggle 
for self-rule had already succeeded while Derg was still in power.34 
Despite observing aspects of „coming together‟ federalism in the FDRE 
Constitution, scholars also note its „holding together‟ features.35Assefa Fiseha, 
for example, argues that since the federation has some „holding together‟ 
aspects, considering it as “a federation built from the nationalities, will be an 
exaggeration”36 In support of this position he inter alia noted: “[a]lthough some 
parts of the country experienced a de facto autonomy in the pre-1991 period, 
many of the constituent states that now form the federation had no such 
experience previously.”37 And he further observed, “the federation is 
incomparable to the states and cantons, for instance, of the United States and 
Switzerland.”38 
It is true that the Ethiopian federation was not, in fact, a coming together 
federation created through the negotiation of ethnic entities which have 
previously existed independently. It might of course be very puzzling to think 
how a hitherto unitarist State like Ethiopia could be reconceived as a coming 
together federation. It still cannot be ignored that under the FDRE Constitution, 
the “nations, nationalities or peoples” of Ethiopia are, at least in principle, 
                                           
31
 Though the Transitional Charter (1991) did not delimit the boundaries of the self-
governing regions that was done by Proclamation No. 7/1992.  
32
 See Andreas Eshete (2003), “Ethnic federalism: new frontiers in Ethiopian politics”, the 
first national conference on Federalism, Conflict and Peace Building, Ministry of Federal 
Affairs and German Technical Cooperation, Addis Ababa, at pp. 160-161.  
33
 Ibid, at p. 161. 
34
 Ibid. 
35
 See Assefa Fiseha, supra note 15, at p. 213.  
36
 Ibid, at p. 214.  
37
 Ibid.   
38
 Ibid.   
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endowed with powers that are not available to states in a truly coming together 
federations such as the USA. For example, as it will be observed below, 
members of the US federation do not have a unilateral right to secede while 
every nation, nationality or people (NNP) in Ethiopia has a right to form its own 
independent state. This, in our view, is the result of the redefinition of Ethiopia 
as a consensual marriage of its ethnic groups (under the FDRE Constitution). 
The essence of this redefinition lies in an approach that considers the various 
ethnic groups living in Ethiopia as the original negotiators and the founding 
members of the Federation. This is manifested in the FDRE constitution starting 
from the Preamble. The Preamble starts with the words, “We the Nations, 
Nationalities and Peoples of Ethiopia Strongly committed, in full and free 
exercise of our right to self-determination …”, indicating the fact that the 
Constitution is a covenant between Ethiopia‟s ethnic groups.    
This sentiment is reflected in Article 8(1) of the Constitution which 
proclaims that “[a]ll sovereign power resides in the Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples of Ethiopia.” Article 8(2) further describes the Constitution as 
“expression of their sovereignty.” According to the FDRE Constitution, when 
the “nations, nationalities and peoples” of Ethiopia create the Federation, they 
reserved to themselves the unconditional right to leave the Union. As such, 
unlike the American Federation which was historically a coming together 
federalism, and yet is considered as a perpetual union39, the Ethiopian 
Constitution which actually transformed a unitary State into a coming together 
type of federalism, was not conceived as a perpetual union.   
Hence, the famous Article 39 of the Constitution grants all nations, 
nationalities and peoples (NNP) of Ethiopia an unconditional right to self-
determination up to secession.40 This provision is arguably the most 
controversial provision of the Constitution.41  The historical source of such a 
                                           
39
 The US Constitution does not explicitly deal with the issue of secession. However, the 
U.S Supreme Court once held that the federation is in principle considered to be a 
perpetual union. For more on the notion of perpetual union, see, in general, Kenneth M. 
Stamp (1978), “The Concept of a Perpetual Union”, Journal of American History, Vol. 
65, No. 1, pp. 5-33.  
40
 For a discussion on Article 39, see in general Ahmednasir M. Abdullahi (1998), “Article 
39 of the Ethiopian Constitution on Secession and Self-Determination: A Panacea to the 
Nationality Question in Africa?”, Law and Politics in Africa, Asia and Latin America, 
Vol. 31, No. 4, pp. 440-455.  
41
 More generally, the issue of ethnic federalism in Ethiopia is very contested. See John 
Young (1996), “Ethnicity and Power in Ethiopia”, Review of African Political Economy, 
No. 70, at p. 537. The main argument against the ethnic federalism is that it might lead to 
further ethnic fragmentation and conflicts which in turn may bring about the total collapse 
of the state. See, for example, Minassie Haile (1996), “The New Ethiopian Constitution: 
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provision can be traced back to the writings of Lenin on the issue that were very 
popular in the Ethiopian students‟ Marxist-Leninist movement in the 1960s‟.42 
In 1969, Wallelign Mekonnen challenged the characterization of Ethiopia as a 
“nation.”    
[S]ociologically speaking at this stage Ethiopia is not really one nation. It is 
made up of a dozen nationalities with their own languages, ways of dressing, 
history, social organization and territorial entity. And what else is a nation? It 
is not made of a people with a particular tongue, particular ways of dressing, 
particular history, particular social and economic organization? Then may I 
conclude that in Ethiopia there is the Oromo Nation, the Tigrai Nation, the 
Amhara Nation, the Gurage Nation, the Sidama Nation, the Wellamo 
[Wolayta] Nation, the Adere [Harari] Nation, and however much you may 
not like it the Somali Nation.43 
Article 39 of the FDRE Constitution is, therefore, the ultimate manifestation 
of the reconceptualization of Ethiopia as a mere marriage of its ethnic groups. It 
is this expansive protection to the right to self-determination of the ethnic 
groups living within the borders of Ethiopia that also sets the tone for the 
constitutional procedure adopted for the creation of new regional states in the 
Ethiopian federation.   
2. Member States of the Federation and the Procedure for the 
Creation of New States: An ethnic-centered Approach 
The image the FDRE Constitution portrays as a coming together federalism 
negotiated and created by the ethnic groups of Ethiopia is only partly reflected 
in the way the original constituent units of the federation were organized. In a 
country with more than 80 ethnic groups, the FDRE Constitution created only 
nine regional states, thereby making most of the regions multi-ethnic. However, 
even within the framework of the original organization, the Constitution is 
unequivocal in affirming the ethnic based nature of the federation. The 
mismatch between the conceptual starting point of the FDRE Constitution and 
the actual 9-states organization of the federation is reconciled by giving each 
                                                                                                            
Its Impact upon Unity, Human Rights and Development”, Suffolk Transnational Law 
Review, Vol. 20, No. 1, pp. 1-84.   
42
 See Lenin (1914), “The Right of Nations to Self-determination” April-June, 1914, 
Reproduced in Lenin (1977), Collected Works, Vol. 20, Progress Publishers, Moscow, pp. 
395 ff.    
43
 See Wallelign Mekonnen (1969), “On the Question of Nationalities in Ethiopia”, HSIU, 
Arts IV, Nov. 17, 1969.   
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ethnic group the right to create its own regional state in a procedure that gives 
the ultimate say to the group which raised the question. 
2.1 The original constituent units of the federation  
According to Article 46 of the FDRE Constitution, “the Federal Democratic 
Republic shall comprise of States,” and their delimitation shall be “on the basis 
of the settlement patterns, language, identity, and consent of the people.”  The 
relative weight given to the various criteria in the creation of regional states is 
not clear. It is not also clear to what extent the criteria were applied by the 
drafters when they created the original nine members of the Federation listed 
under Article 47(1) of the FDRE Constitution.     
Considering the central place the nations, nationalities and peoples are 
expected to play in the constitutional arrangement, holding “all sovereign 
power” and having “an unconditional right to self-determination including the 
right to secession,” one would expect their consent to play a huge role in the 
creation of States. In reality, however, consent of the people concerned did not 
appear to have played a big role in the creation of the original member States of 
the Federation. Apparently, there were no referendums conducted when the 
original delimitation was done.    
Article 47(1) recognizes nine regional states as the members of the Federal 
Democratic Republic of Ethiopia. These are: the State of Tigray, the State of 
Afar, the State of Amhara, the State of Oromia, the State of Somalia, the State 
Benshangul/Gumuz, the State of the Southern, Nations, Nationalities and 
Peoples, the State of the Gambela Peoples, and the State of Harari People.    
Few observations can be made regarding the list of States recognized by the 
Constitution. First, in terms of terminological choice, while the official Amharic 
version44 refers to the states as “kilil”, which could have been translated to 
“region”, the English version employs the term “State” using the capital “S”. In 
referring to the regional states as “the State of Tigray”, “State of Oromia” etc, 
the Constitution appears to follow the pattern of the official name of some 
sovereign countries such as “State of Eritrea”, “State of Israel” and “State of 
Kuwait”.  
This problematic terminological choice of the English version becomes even 
more confusing when it comes to the way the Constitution referred to one of the 
regions. Somali region is referred to as “the State of Somalia.” Considering 
there is a neighboring State with the name Somalia, this nomenclature is clearly 
confusing. Probably recognizing the problematic nature of the constitutional 
nomenclatures, regional states in Ethiopia officially refer to themselves as 
                                           
44
 According to Article 106 of the FDRE Constitution, it is the Amharic version that has the 
final legal authority.  
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“national regional states”.45 What the Constitution calls “State of Somalia” is 
also referred to as “Somali regional State”46, apparently with a view to 
distinguish it from Somalia.    
The way the Constitution chose to name most of the regions indicates its 
unequivocal emphasis on ethnicity in organizing the constituent units. Five of 
the nine regional states of the federation, namely, Tigray, Amhara, Oromia, 
Somali and Afar are named after the ethnic group which has the overwhelming 
majority in the respective regions.47 The emphasis on ethnicity is exhibited in 
the way the Harari region is named after the Harari ethnic group even though 
other two numerically superior ethnic groups reside in the region.48 
Paradoxically though, more than 50 ethnic groups in southern Ethiopia were 
put in a single region called the Southern Nations, Nationalities, and Peoples. 
That was done by changing the regional arrangement that was in place in the 
Transitional Period that recognized five regions in the area, namely, Sidama, 
Wolaita, Omo, Kaffa, and Guraghe-Hadya-Kambata.49 Some of these ethnic 
groups such as Sidama have more population than some of the original member 
states of the Federation. It is therefore not clear what objective criteria were 
used to make the original delimitation. In this regard, Anderson noted that the 
original decisions concerning the boundaries of the constituent units in Ethiopia 
were essentially made by the ruling coalition, EPRDF, in a process that “had 
minimal openness” and “very limited public consultation”.50 
2.2 The right to create new regional states and its procedure  
There appears to be an apparent mismatch between the conceptual starting point 
of the FDRE Constitution that conceives each nation, nationality and people as 
the original negotiator and founding member of the federation and the actual 9-
states organization of the federation. This situation was probably inevitable as 
giving each ethnic group its own regional state is unnecessary and impractical. 
Nevertheless, the Constitution reconciled the apparent conflict by giving each 
                                           
45
 See for example, Article 1 of the 2001 Revised Constitution of Amhara Regional State.  
46
 See Article 1 of the Revised Constitution of the Somali Regional State, April 2002.   
47
 See Jaap de Visser, Nico Steytler and Yonatan Feseha (2016), “The Role of Ethnicity in 
the Demarcation of Internal Boundaries in South Africa and Ethiopia”, paper presented at 
the Annual Conference of the International Association of Centres for Federal Studies, 
Rome, Sept. 2012, at p. 3.  
48
 Ibid.  
49
 See Nigussie Afesha Aytaged (2016), “The Ethiopian Constitutional Promises to the 
Nation and Nationalities: The Myth and the operational reality”, Bahir Dar University 
Journal of Law, Vol. 6, No. 2, at p. 241. 
50
 See George Anderson (2014), Creation of Constituent Units in Federal Systems, Center 
for Constitutional Transitions at NYU Law, at p. 6. 
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nation, nationality and people the right to create its own regional state. Article 
47(2) unequivocally affirmed this right: “Nations, Nationalities and Peoples 
within the States enumerated in sub-Article 1 of this article have the right to 
establish, at any time, their own states.” [emphasis added]  
The right is clearly a reflection of the Constitution‟s implicit characterization 
of the Ethiopian federation as a unity created by the agreement of the Ethiopian 
nations, nationalities and peoples. As noted in the above section, these ethnic 
groups are given an unconditional right to self-determination up to secession. 
Indeed, the right to create regional states under Article 47 can also be 
considered as one aspect of the right to self-determination under Article 39. The 
latter provides for the protection of the right to self-determination including the 
right to self-administration (internal self-determination) and external self-
determination (secession). A demand to create new regional state is obviously 
an aspect of the right to internal self-determination.   
The holders of this right are obviously “nations, nationalities and peoples.” 
As a result, the definition given to this expression is very essential to determine 
the nature of new regional states the establishment of which is permitted under 
the Constitution. As defined in Article 39(5) of the Constitution:      
A “Nation, Nationality or People” for the purpose of this Constitution, is a 
group of people who have or share a large measure of a common culture or 
similar customs, mutual intelligibility of language, belief in a common or 
related identities, a common psychological make-up, and who inhabit an 
identifiable, predominantly contiguous territory.  
One of the striking aspects of the above definition is that it does not 
differentiate between “nations”, “nationalities” and “peoples”.51 One could, 
therefore, wonder why the three terms are used if they were ultimately to have 
the same definition. Leaving the definitional issue aside, the cumulative reading 
of Article 47(2) and Article 39(5) of the Constitution appear to limit the right to 
create new regional states only to groups which can be identified as “nation, 
nationality or people.” As such, the Constitution does not seem to envisage the 
possibility of creating regions along non-ethnic lines. This is of course in line 
with the Constitution‟s general ethnic-centered orientation.    
One could ask whether the expression “at any time” in Article 47(2) is 
intended to indicate the fact that such a right cannot be restricted even at a time 
of State of Emergency. The wording of the provision appears to support this 
interpretation. However, the constitutional provision on State of Emergency 
suggests otherwise. According to Article 93(4)(b), “the Council of Ministers 
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shall have the power to suspend such political and democratic rights contained 
in this Constitution to the extent necessary to avert the conditions that required 
the declaration of a state of emergency.” When sub-Article 4(c) of the same 
provision lists the rights which may not be suspended or limited by the 
emergency powers of the Council of Ministers, it only mentions Articles 1, 18, 
25 and sub-Articles 1 and 2 of Article 39 of the Constitution.  
Apparently, Article 47 (2) of the Constitution is not part of the list of 
provisions which are non-derogable. As such, there appears to be nothing that 
prevents the Federal government from suspending this right during a state of 
emergency. One could probably wonder if the right to create regional states 
under Article 47(2) should itself be non-derogable considering it is one aspect of 
the right to self-determination under Article 39(1) and (2).52  However, it should 
be noted that the list of non-derogable rights under Article 93(4)(c) did not 
include some of the sub-provisions in Article 39 itself. For example, Article 
39(3) which talks about every Nation, Nationality and People‟s in “right to a full 
measure of self-government which includes the right to establish institutions of 
government in the territory that it inhabits …” is not included in the list of non-
derogable rights. In fact, the procedure for exercising self-determination up to 
secession under Article 39(4) is not also found in the list of non-derogable 
provisions. Therefore, if conditions that necessitate declaration of emergency 
are in place, the Federal Government can suspend the application of Article 
47(2).  
The right that is given to every NNP to create its own regional state is 
exercisable based on the procedures provided under Article 47(3). The 
procedures are also ethnic-centered in the sense that they do not give any 
decisive role to the federal government, or to the concerned State Council. 
According to the provision the right is exercisable:  
a) When the demand for statehood has been approved by a two-thirds 
majority of the members of the Council of the Nation, Nationality or 
People concerned, and the demand is presented in writing to the State 
Council;  
b) When the Council that received the demand has organized a referendum 
within one year to be held in the Nation, Nationality or People that made 
the demand;  
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c) When the demand for statehood is supported by a majority vote in the 
referendum;  
d) When the State Council will have transferred its powers to the Nation, 
Nationality or People that made the demand; and  
e) When the new State created by the referendum without any need for 
application, directly becomes a member of the Federal Democratic 
Republic of Ethiopia.53 
As it can be observed from the above provision, in the procedure for the 
creation of new regional States, it is the desire of the concerned people that 
plays a central role. There is an apparent resemblance in the secession procedure 
in Article 39 and the procedure for the establishment of new States in Article 
47. In Article 39(4)(a), the procedure to exercise the right to self-determination, 
including secession, of every NNP shall be triggered “when a demand for 
secession has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the members of the 
Legislative Council of the Nation, Nationality or People concerned”. Similarly, 
under Article 47(3)(a), the procedure for the exercise of “the right of any 
Nation, Nationality or People to form its own state” shall start “when the 
demand for statehood has been approved by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the Council of the NNP concerned, and the demand is presented in 
writing to the State Council”.    
There is obviously a slight difference in wording in the above two 
provisions. While Article 39(4)(a) refers to the “Legislative Council of the 
Nation, Nationality or People”, Article 47(3)(a) refers to “the Council of the 
Nation, Nationality or People concerned.” One could wonder whether this 
implies a substantive difference in meaning. Article 39(4)(a) qualifies the term 
“Council” by adding the word “Legislative”. It is not clear whether the 
“Legislative Council” referred to here is equivalent to “the State Council” 
referred to in Article 50(5) of the Constitution. In any case, a similar 
qualification is rightly absent in Article 47(3)(a). That is understandable 
considering the ethnic group demanding regional statehood will obviously be 
organized at a zonal or lower level of administration.   
Even though the “Council” mentioned in Article 47(3)(a) plays a key role in 
the process of establishing a new state as the chief negotiator, the Constitution 
does not explicitly specify how it is established and who should serve on it.54 
However, one can safely consider such “Councils” as results of the right of 
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 The requirements which are provided under Article 47(3) of the FDRE Constitution are 
also reproduced in Article 19(3) of Proclamation No. 251/2001 on Consolidation of the 
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54
 See Tom Pätz (2005), „Ethiopia (Federal Democratic Republic of Ethiopia)‟, in Ann L. 
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every Nation, Nationality and People to “a full measure of self-government 
which includes the right to establish institutions of government.”55 
Be this as it may, the demand for regional statehood that is raised and 
discussed in the Council of the Nation, Nationality and People should be 
approved by a two-thirds majority. Although the two-third majority requirement 
is normally a high threshold, it is not difficult to achieve it in a campaign that is 
driven by nationalist sentiments. Once the demand for a regional Statehood is 
approved by a two-thirds majority in the Council of the concerned Nation, 
Nationality or People, it should then be presented in writing to the State 
Council.56 The Constitution does not seem to give the State Council an option to 
reject the question. Rather, the State Council is expected to organize “a 
referendum within one year to be held in the Nation, Nationality or People that 
made the demand.” [emphasis added] Despite putting this very short time frame, 
the Constitution did not specify the possible consequence of failure to organize 
referendum within one year. 
Article 19(3)(2) Proclamation No. 251/2001 tries to fill the gap by ensuring 
the right to appeal to the House of Federation which can be exercised by the 
party which claims that its demand for regional State formation has not been 
executed within the time specified or alleges to have dissatisfaction with the 
decision. Such complaint has to be presented to the House in writing by the 
Council of the NNP that claimed for the formation of State.57 The House is then 
expected to give final decision on the issue within two years after receipt of the 
complaint.58 
The above provisions of Proclamation No. 251/2001 seem to imply the 
intention to relax the rather strict procedure of the Constitution. As mentioned 
above, if the two-third majority is achieved in the Council of NNP demanding to 
form its own state and if the demand is presented in writing, the Constitution 
does not seem to give the State Council the right to reject the request. 
Proclamation No. 251/2001, however, does not only envisage the possibility of 
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the referendum not being conducted within one year, it also gives the House two 
years to consider the appeal. Apparently, the Proclamation gives more time for 
the House to consider the appeal than the timeframe to organize the referendum 
given (to the State Council) under the Constitution. Although the additional 
procedures included in Proclamation No. 251/2001 seem to indicate the 
lawmaker‟s recognition of the unreasonably strict nature of the Constitution‟s 
one-year time frame, their constitutionality can be questioned.  
This issue was raised recently in the context of the Sidama quest for regional 
statehood when a referendum was not organized within the constitutionally 
specified one-year period. Many agitators for Sidama regional statehood were of 
the view that the failure to organize referendum within the one-year period 
entitles them to declare regional statehood unilaterally. Although the threat was 
not actually acted upon, the violence that ensued in the region amidst the 
controversy has indeed put the problematic nature of constitutionally provided 
procedure into a spotlight.59 
A problem one can notice in the procedure for the creation of new regional 
states is the fact that the issue is exclusively left to the ethnic group raising the 
demand. The Constitution is designed with the assumption that ultimate 
sovereignty lies on each nation, nationality and people, and the freedom to form 
one‟s own state at any time appears to have been used as a mechanism to entice 
the various ethnic groups to be included in the original nine states.60 The 
Constitution does not envisage the need for the involvement of the Federal 
Government or regional states. It is as if there is nothing whatsoever in the 
creation of new states that would affect the other regions or the country as a 
whole. As highlighted in the next section, this purely ethnic-centered approach 
embodied in the Ethiopian Constitution is in stark contrast with procedures for 
the creation of new states enshrined in other federal constitutions.    
3. Creation of New States in Other Federal Constitutions   
Constitutions of many federal countries deal with the issue of creation of new 
states. A cursory overview of the provisions dealing with the issue of creation of 
new states in various federal constitutions exhibits that, these constitutions are 
different from the FDRE Constitution at least in one important respect. Almost 
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all constitutions considered in this research put limitations on the creation of 
new constituent units by allowing federal parliaments and/or other concerned 
constituent units to have a say in the process. A quick overview (in  
Section 3.1) of the relevant provisions of the constitutions of some randomly 
selected federal and quasi-federal countries such as the USA, Australia, South 
Africa, Brazil, Pakistan, Mexico, Germany and Switzerland can provide 
excellent examples to elaborate the general trend. Section 3.2 focuses on the 
history of state creation in two purposively selected ethnically diverse countries, 
namely, Nigeria and India. Their experience shows the sensitivity and 
complexity of the state creating exercise, and the constitutional procedures for 
the creation of new states in these countries are in line with the general trend 
that gives the Federal government a decisive role in the process.  
3.1 General overview    
Due to the history of the American Federation as a coming together federalism, 
the Constitution was more open to the admission of new states to the Union than 
the creation of new states from already existing ones. Section 3 of the American 
Constitution provided that “new states may be admitted by the Congress into the 
Union.” However, it prohibited the formation of new states “within the 
jurisdiction of any other State.” It also prohibits the formation of new states “by 
the Junction of two or more states, or parts of States without the consent of the 
Legislatures of the States concerned as well as of the Congress.”   
In comparison to the US Constitution, the Australian Constitution follows a 
more open approach to the creation of new states from already existing ones. 
Nevertheless, the federal parliament has still a role to play in the creation of new 
states. Besides, the states that are affected by the creation of the new state also 
have a say. According to Article 123 of the Constitution of Australia, “[a] new 
State may be formed by separation of territory from a State, but only with the 
consent of the Parliament thereof, and a new State may be formed by the union 
of two or more States or parts of States, but only with the consent of the 
Parliaments of the States affected.” In formal terms, although it is the State 
Parliament that will decide on the issue, a referendum would be most likely.61 
According to the Australian model, therefore, the creation of a new state 
requires gaining the consent of the majority of residents in the region where the 
new state is to be formed.62 
Under the South African Constitution, the issue of creating new provinces or 
merging the already existing ones is treated as a question of constitutional 
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amendment. Accordingly, alterations to “provincial boundaries, powers, 
functions or institutions” are subject to the amendment procedure of Section 
74(3)(ii) of the Constitution that requires the approval of two-thirds of the 
National Assembly and six provinces in the National Council of Provinces. In 
addition, the proposed alterations should also be approved by the provincial 
legislatures in question.63 
In Brazil‟s Constitution64, Article 18 provides three main modalities for the 
creation of new states, i.e. merger of already existing states, subdivision, or 
annexation.65 The Brazilian Constitution envisages the possibility of considering 
the views of the population in the counties involved. However, here too, the 
final say is reserved to the National Congress.  
Giving a role to the national parliament in the creation of new states can also 
be observed in Pakistan‟s Constitution. Article 1(3) of Pakistan‟s Constitution of 
1973, give the Majlis-e-Shoora (Parliament), the power to admit (by law) “into 
the Federation new States or areas on such terms and conditions as it thinks fit.”   
Similarly, in Mexico, the Federal Government plays a role in the creation of 
new states. However, the procedure of state creation in the Mexican 
Constitution has more rigorous requirements.  According to Article 73 of the 
Constitution of Mexico (1917 (rev. 2015)), admitting new states into the Union 
(Art 73(I)) and “creating new states within the limits of the existing ones” 
(Article 73(III)) are within the power of the Congress. In addition to giving the 
power to decide on the creation of new states for the Congress, the Constitution 
lists various requirements that should be met. The requirements include: 
population size, viability, report about usefulness or inappropriateness of 
creation of new states and voting in each house.66 
In the procedure for the creation of new states in the Mexican Constitution, 
there is emphasis on examining the usefulness of the creation. There is the need 
to approve the proposal by two-thirds of the votes in each House, and the 
majority of the state legislatures are expected to approve it. The procedure 
acknowledges that the creation of new states is an issue that could affect the 
whole nation.    
Germany emphasizes on efficiency arguments for the creation of a new state. 
Article 29 of its constitution (Basic Law) provides that the federal units 
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(Länders) that constitute the federal territory “may be revised to ensure that each 
land be of size and capacity to perform its functions effectively.”67 Besides, the 
constitution also gives due regard to “regional, historical and cultural ties, 
economic efficiency and the requirements of local and regional planning” in the 
creation of new Länder.68 
The procedure for the creation of new Länder in Germany is referendum-
based and it can be initiated by the federal parliament or by petition of 10% of 
the voters in a contiguous area. 69 A major issue in the creation of new states is 
whether already existing states affected by a potential loss of territory have a say 
on the proposal to establish new state.70 Germany requires the consent of the 
affected state from whose territories or parts of territories a new land or land 
with redefined boundaries to be established.71 More specifically, Article 29(3) 
of Germany‟s Constitution (Basic Law) provides that a proposal to create a new 
state can be vetoed by a two-thirds majority in the territory of the affected land 
as a whole.  
As mentioned earlier in the introduction, Switzerland has a stable federalism 
with respect to the number of the constituting federal units (Cantons)72 other 
than the creation of the Canton of Jura in 1979, which necessitated clear 
constitutional guidelines or rules on how to create a new state.73 Article 53 of 
the current Federal Constitution of the Swiss Confederation that deals with the 
“number and territory of the Cantons” has been added due to the Jura 
experience.74 According to the provision, preserving the existing number of 
Cantons and territories appears to be the preferred position. Sub-article 1 states 
that “the Confederation shall protect the existence and territory of the Cantons.” 
Creation of new Cantons is therefore subject to stringent requirements. It 
“requires the consent of the citizens of the Cantons concerned together with the 
consent of the People and the Cantons.”75 This means, apart from the consent of 
the citizens of the Cantons concerned, the proposal should get a majority 
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support in a country-wide referendum and the majority of the Swiss Cantons 
should support it.76 
In all the constitutions considered above, the issue of creating constituent 
units is nowhere completely left to the decision of the group/region that raised 
the question. As highlighted below, similar trends are observed in the Indian and 
the Nigerian constitutions which manage ethnically diverse entities like 
Ethiopia.    
 
3.2  Creation of new member states in ethnically diverse federations: 
examples of Nigeria and India    
3.2.1 Nigeria   
Nigeria is a highly diverse country with over 374 ethno-lingual groups, each 
with its distinguishing culture and tradition.77 Before the advent of colonial rule, 
these ethnic groups were either encapsulated in the major kingdoms and empires 
which comprised the area or were resisting annexation by those empires and 
kingdoms.78 The situation ended when all these ethnic groups were conquered 
by the British and included into one entity.79 
Some writers identify several stages in the evolution of the Nigerian federal 
character. These stages include: the period of informal federation 1900-1946; 
the first phase of formal federation, 1946-1966; and the second phase of formal 
federation, 1967- present.80 Except for a brief period in 1966 when the military 
decreed a unitary system of government, federalism remained part of Nigeria‟s 
political system.81 
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However, the nature and structure of Nigerian federation has gone through 
significant changes over the years. Part of the change occurred in the form of an 
increase in the number of the members of the federation. When the British 
formally introduced a federal structure of government in the 1946, Richard‟s 
Constitution82, they divided the country only into three unequal regions. As a 
result, at independence, Nigerian Federation still had only three major regions 
(Northern, Eastern & Western Regions) and a „Federal Capital Territory‟ of 
Lagos.  However, due to changes in subsequent years, the Nigerian federation 
was transformed from a highly decentralized country with three large regions to 
a highly centralized one with 36 states and a Federal Capital Territory.83 
Agitations for the creation of new states are almost as old as the Nigerian 
nation.84 Although questions for decentralization in the form of creating new 
states and local governments continue to be raised even before independence in 
196085, the idea was rejected “because of the difficulty in drawing a „clean‟ 
boundary which “does not create fresh minority”, among others.”86 Sir Henry 
Willink Commission was instituted in 1957 to enquire into the fears of the 
minorities and suggest the means of allaying them. The Commission found 
evidence of discrimination and other problems alleged by the minorities, it 
acknowledged the genuineness of their fears and anxieties, and concluded that 
the solution to the problem of minorities lies in the political process, rather than 
the creation of separate States for them.87 
Since independence, however, numerous states and local governments have 
been created. The three regions at independence have now been partitioned into 
36 states, a „federal capital territory‟ and seven hundred and seventy-four Local 
Government Areas.88 A unique feature of the Nigerian state creation exercise is 
that the military has affected the structural transformation of the federation.89 
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This is not surprising considering, in Nigeria, military rule was the vogue rather 
than an aberration, given the fact that, in Nigeria‟s first twenty-one years of 
sovereign statehood, the military was in power for thirteen years.90 Thus, the 
majority of state creation exercises in Nigeria were solely undertaken by the 
military. The only time that a civilian government created a sub-national unit 
was in 1963 when the Mid-West Region was carved out of the defunct Western 
Region”.91 
It was not because agitations for state creation were absent that civilian 
administrations did not create many states. In fact, as one writer put it:    
The question of creation of states was one knotty problem that the Shagari led 
civilian administration had to contend with. States creation was especially 
popular during the Second Republic, with virtually every politician 
championing the creation of additional constituent units in their localities. In 
the event, the country was abuzz with state creation movements. So emotive 
and compelling was the advocacy for more states that two separate 
committees on state creation had to be set up in 1982. First to be set up was 
the House of Representatives Committee on State Creation. The other 
committee was constituted by the then President Shagari, who considered it 
his responsibility as the President to try to bring in consensus and 
understanding, and to project his party‟s position on the state question.92 
Even though the committees on state creation recommended the creation of 
additional states, due to intense politicking, it was not possible for the civilian 
administration during the Second Republic to create new states before it was 
overthrown in a military putsch in December 1983.93 The process of creating 
states under civilian administrations was further saddled with constitutional 
bottlenecks.94 Military regimes, however, were not restricted by constitutional 
limitations. Besides, military governments also tend to use creation of new 
states to gain popular support.95 As a result, it is during military regimes that 
most of the 36 members of Nigerian federation were created.    
One may, however, wonder why questions for the creation of new states 
arise. Various arguments are advanced to justify requests for state creation in 
Nigeria. In earlier times, state creation was advanced as a means to tackle the 
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menace of majority domination over minorities.96 However, ethnicity and 
economic considerations appear to be more important drivers for the state 
creation exercise in Nigeria. According to Suberu “distributive pressures lie at 
the roots of the clamour for new subnational units in Nigeria.” He observes that 
the Nigerian federal system explicitly legitimates and accommodates sectional-
territorial constituencies, and thus “provides the structural and institutional 
framework for the organisation and mediation of the ethnic competition for 
public resources in Nigeria.”97 Ethnicism and the role of ethnic elites in 
agitations for the creation of new states should not also be ignored. In this 
regard, Adetoye observed:    
The purpose of federalism and state creation as devices for decentralization 
for the purpose of effective governance and service delivery has been 
sacrificed on the altar of ethnicism and ethnic representation. Rather than 
seen and used as a dispassionate tool of developmental administration, these 
political units (states) into which the Nigerian federation has been divided, 
have become instruments of negotiation for patronage by the ethnic elite and 
the ruling class.98 
The above concern is specifically relevant in the Ethiopian situation 
considering the Constitution‟s highly ethnic-centered approach that leaves the 
decision for creation of new states for the NNP that raised the question. As 
noted in the above discussion, the expansion of the members of the Nigerian 
federation has primarily occurred by military governments. However, we should 
still consider the procedure for the creation of new states in the Nigerian 
Constitution and see if it is fundamentally different from those which have been 
considered above. According to Part II (8)(1) of the Nigerian Constitution (as 
revised in 1999):    
An Act of the National Assembly for the purpose of creating a new 
State shall only be passed if-  
(a) a request, supported by at least two-thirds majority of members 
(representing the area demanding the creation of the new State) in each of 
the following, namely - (i) the Senate and the House of Representatives, 
(ii) the House of Assembly in respect of the area, and (iii) the local 
government councils in respect of the area, is received by the National 
Assembly;  
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(b) a proposal for the creation of the State is thereafter approved in a 
referendum by at least two-thirds majority of the people of the area where 
the demand for creation of the State originated;  
(c) the result of the referendum is then approved by a simple majority of all 
the States of the Federation supported by a simple majority of members of 
the Houses of Assembly; and  
(d) the proposal is approved by a resolution passed by two-thirds majority of 
members of each House of the National Assembly.  
As can be observed from the above provision, a request for state creation 
should be supported not only by those demanding it, but also by other members 
of the federation and a two-thirds majority of members of each House of the 
National Assembly. Like the constitutions of various federal countries 
considered above, the procedure enshrined in the Constitution of Nigeria 
indicates that state creation exercise is not understood as a right that can 
exclusively be exercised only by those who raised it.    
3.2.2  India    
The territorial evolution of the Union of India has gone through several changes 
in the course of the past seven decades. The Constitution of India adopted on 
26th January 1949 conceived the Union as indestructible.99 The same 
Constitution, however, has opened the door for the admission of new territories 
or creation of new states into the union, or the establishment of new States. The 
parliament has the power to “form a new State by separation of territory from 
any State or by uniting two or more States or parts of States or by uniting any 
territory to a part of any State” (Art. 3, Constitution of Union of India 1949)    
The Indian federal system which started with 14 States and 6 Union 
Territories has now expanded to 29 States and Seven Union Territories.100 
Unequal regional development, identity, autonomy, good governance or 
political participation are some of the driving factors leading to the proliferation 
of new states in India.101 The demand for the recognition of new states within 
the Union of India is challenging given the linguistic and cultural diversity of 
the country. The Constitution does not provide indicative principles for the 
recognition of new states. Different committees have been established to 
overcome this challenge. At the early stages of the Indian Federal System, for 
example, various committees were established to examine the federal 
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Structure.102 The State Restructuring Committee (SRC) established in 1953, 
specifically, has made significant contributions by identifying concrete 
considerations for the recognition of new states within the Union of India.103 
The main parties involved for the creation of new states as stipulated in the 
Constitution are the president, the parliament, and the legislature of State/s. The 
role of the President in the process of state creation is extensive. It is not the 
legislature of the state but the president who has the power to introduce a Bill 
for the creation of new states in either houses of the parliament.    
It is more likely that the proposed Bill for such effect may have elements that 
affect the interest of one or more states within the Union. If it is so, the 
President is required to refer it to the legislature of the concerned State for 
expressing its views. The Legislature of the State, on its part, may express its 
views within the time limit stipulated in the reference or a period set by the 
president. Although the Constitution puts a mandatory requirement on the 
president to seek an opinion from the concerned state legislature/s, it is up to the 
legislature to give or not to give its views on the matter. The failure of the 
legislature to provide its views within the time limit set does not stop the 
procedure of state creation.   
States have a marginal role in the creation of new states since the 
Constitution limits their engagement in terms of non-binding opinion. The 
decisive engagement of the parliament in the creation of new states while 
keeping Legislature of States at the margins could be the manifestation of the 
“holding together” model of federalism that characterizes the Indian federal 
structure.   
The expanded role of the president and the limited engagement of the state 
legislature in the creation of new states are justified by the rights of minorities. 
During the making of the Constitution, there was deliberation on the question of 
who should be empowered to initiate the process of state creation. There was a 
proposal (such as an argument made by Prof. K T Shah) that the Bill for the 
creation of a new state should originate from the State legislature “whose 
boundaries are proposed to be altered, or whose areas are proposed to be 
increased or diminished”  
Any question which relates to the alteration of the present units, their 
territories, boundaries or name, should begin with the people primarily 
affected, and should not come from the authority or power at the Center.104 
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K. T. Shah argued that a bottom-up approach gives the opportunity to consult 
the legislature directly affected instead of imposing it from above. The 
fundamental democratic principles demand consulting the people affected. 
Laying it down from above put excessive power in the parliament and 
contravenes the very idea of democracy embodied in the Union‟s Constitution.    
The honorable Shri K. Santhanam on his part opposed the amendment 
proposed by K. T. Shah claiming that the empowerment of the State legislature 
would mean that “no minority in any State can ask for separation of territory, 
either for forming a new province or for joining an adjacent State unless it can 
get a majority in that State legislature”. Moreover, Shri contended that giving 
the power to the State legislature would create the tyranny of the majority in 
every province and state, instead of democracy.105 
K. T. Shah‟s proposal did not make it to the constitution on the justification 
that the procedure may contravene against the interest of minorities in those 
regional States dominated by a majority group. Giving the power to the 
president was considered friendlier to minority groups seeking their own new 
states from any region of States.    
Another important consideration in the procedure for the creation of new 
states under the Indian federal system is the voting rule. Given the intensity of 
the matter, one may expect a special voting rule to such effect. The Constitution, 
however, provides no special voting rule. A simple majority of the members 
present and voting in the parliament suffice to determine the creation of a new 
state in the Union (in accordance with Article 100, Indian Constitution).     
One could wonder whether a similar concern regarding minority protection 
could be raised in the Ethiopian context due to the lack of involvement on the 
part of the federal government in the creation of new states. In our view, such 
concern cannot occur in the Ethiopian context because the regional states merely 
have a facilitative role in the creation of new states. The relevant provisions in 
the Ethiopian Constitution do not suggest any say by the regional administration 
in the decision-making process. The concern in the Ethiopian context rather lies 
in giving the right to establish a new state for the „nation, nationality or people‟ 
demanding it. This approach is not in conformity with the comparative 
experience and good practices followed in most federal constitutions. The 
Ethiopian approach has actually ignored many important considerations that 
should have been taken into account in the process. That is where the real 
concern lies.    
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4. Overlooked Issues in the FDRE’s Constitution Ethnic-
centered Approach 
As the discussion in the above section could make clear, the procedure for the 
creation of new states under the FDRE Constitution solely focuses on the desire 
of the “nation”, “nationality” and “people” that demands it. With its sole focus 
on ethnicity and no external procedural or substantive limit on the exercise of 
the right, the Constitution overlooks some important issues with non-negligible 
consequences.  As Section 4.1 indicates, unlike some of the federal constitutions 
reviewed above, the FDRE Constitution does not address the issue of merger. It 
rather focuses on the possible creation of new smaller ethnic-based states in a 
procedure that leaves the ultimate decision to the ethnic group that raised the 
question. This procedure provides very limited room for objective 
considerations related to economic viability and administrative efficiency 
(Section 4.2). It is to be noted that there is almost no guarantee to ensure equity 
both in the process and outcome (Section 4.3). The exercise of the right by one 
ethnic group is likely to have a demonstration effect which triggers further 
fragmentation (Section 4.4). Moreover, Section 4.5 discusses the effect of the 
creation of many new states which is likely to have an unintended impact of 
making the amendment of the FDRE Constitution practically more rigorous, 
thereby potentially creating minority tyranny.  
4.1 Lack of clarity on the procedure for merger    
Some of the federal constitutions discussed above provide not only procedures 
for the creation of new states from already existing ones, but also envisage the 
possibility of creating a new state by merging two or more states or by taking 
parts of two or more already existing States. Some constitutions also leave the 
door open for other states to join the union. The Ethiopian constitution is silent 
on these issues and fails to answer several important questions.    
First, can two or more existing states merge to form a new state? For 
example, can adjacent regions such as Harari and Oromia, or Amhara and 
Beneshangul, etc decide to merge and create a new region? Second, is it 
possible to divide existing States on non-ethnic lines to create new regional 
states? For example, is it possible the bigger regions such as Oromia, Somali 
region and Amhara be divided into several regions? Third, can people living in 
two regional states adjacent to one another form a separate region? For example, 
can the Guji Oromos and Gedeos decide to form a separate new regional state?    
As noted above, it is clear that the FDRE Constitution does not directly deal 
with the issue of merger of various states to create new ones. However, 
considering that some of the already existing states of the federation are clearly 
multi-ethnic, the Constitution does not prohibit the creation of bigger multi-
ethnic regions. However, with no clear procedure to be followed, it is not clear 
118                             MIZAN LAW REVIEW, Vol. 13, No.1                             September 2019 
 
 
how this could be constitutionally materialized. For example, if a newly created 
state wants to get back to its former regional state, what procedure would be 
followed? Can the procedure that is pursued for the creation of new states be 
used to reverse the decision?   
The issue of creating new states on non-ethnic lines does not seem to be 
supported by the spirit of the Constitution. By making “nations, nationalities, or 
peoples” the holders of the right, the Constitution appears to have excluded the 
possibility of asking for separate regions on non-ethnic grounds. By the same 
token, the Constitution does not seem to permit the creation of multiethnic 
regions by taking territories from already existing national regional states.    
4.2   Absence of objective considerations related to economic viability 
and administrative efficiency    
The ethnic-centered approach for creation of new states under the FDRE 
Constitution gives every nation, nationality or people the right to form its own 
regional state irrespective of its number. On the other hand, the Constitution 
does not provide a clear procedure for a possible creation of non-ethnic regions 
for reasons such as administrative efficiency. By following this approach, the 
Constitution appears to assume every ethnic group not just as a cultural unit but 
also a natural economic and administrative unit. The democratic process is 
limited within the ethnic group in which the question is raised, and there is no 
other way to ensure that considerations related to economic viability, 
administrative efficiency and more generally the usefulness of creating new 
state are properly made.    
4.3 Lack of guarantee to ensure equity in outcomes and process   
The creation of a new state within the federal structure undoubtedly results in a 
change in the boundaries of already existing states. More specifically, the State 
within which the demand for statehood is sought will be directly affected by the 
alteration of territorial boundaries. Consulting the council of those states, whose 
boundaries and interests are to be altered would be the proper course to ensure 
equity in the process and outcome of new state creation.    
The constitutional provision that dictates the procedure for the creation of 
new states, however, puts greater emphasis on the NNP seeking statehood than 
other stakeholders affected by the process and outcome. The power to initiate 
the demand for the creation of a new state is given exclusively to the NNP. 
Once the demand for statehood is approved by a two-thirds majority of the 
members of the Council of the NNP concerned, the Constitution requires the 
demand to be presented in writing to the State Council. Neither the State 
Council nor the Federal government has the power to propose the creation of a 
new state. This approach puts excessive power in the hands of the NNP, to the 
prejudice of the concerned State or the country as a whole. It severely impedes 
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the State and Federal government of any attempt to create a new state or 
amalgamate already existing ones for economic or any other pragmatic reasons.    
Moreover, the extent to which the State Council reflexes its muscles on the 
demand of statehood is not clear. It is vague under the Constitution whether the 
state council has the power to vote on the demand submitted in writing or 
directly proceed with the referendum. According to Article 47(1)(b) of the 
Constitution, the State Council that received the demand for the creation of a 
new state has the responsibility to organize a referendum within one year to be 
held in the NNP that made the demand. If no deliberation is made in the State 
Council for accepting or rejecting the statehood demand, the role of the 
concerned State will be very symbolic and minimal in the outcome. The 
position of the Constitution is very clear that the NNP are the true sovereignty 
holders and States are not. The Constitution seems consistent in this regard for 
giving excessive power to the concerned NNP in the creation of new states, 
while keeping the role of the State Council at the margin.  
The Constitutional choice of starting the process of state creation from the 
initiatives of the NNP (that is primarily concerned) is not a problem per se. This 
bottom-up approach could be friendlier to the fundamental democratic 
principles and the sovereign power holders as enshrined in the Constitution. 
However, the absence of express cautions in the course of the creation of new 
states deviates from the very purpose of institutionalization.  
Creating a new state may be embarked upon irrespective of its negative 
externalities. For example, the self-interested choices of that group to form a 
new state may contradict the interest of the nation as a whole or at times may 
result a situation where the majority of NNPs do not prefer.106 As much as 
protecting the right of a given NNPs to create its own new state is relevant, the 
interest of other NNPs in the concerned State or adjacent State/s whose interests 
are directly or indirectly affected by the potential alteration should also be 
equally respected for the sake of horizontal equity. In this regard, the 
Constitution does not provide procedural safeguards to protect the interest of 
NNPs which may be potentially affected by the demand for the creation of a 
new state. Apparently, it would have been more reasonable, at least, to allow 
other NNPs affected by the demand to express their views.  
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4.4 The demonstration effect, risk of fragmentation and territorial and 
boundary related conflicts    
The right-based approach for the creation of new states with no meaningful 
external limitation poses the risk of continuous fragmentation. This risk is 
exacerbated by what political scientists call “demonstration effect.” This issue is 
usually discussed in connection with the principle of national self-
determination. Scholars argue that the application of self-determination by one 
group would have destabilizing effect for the international system as it could 
license a secessionist free-for-all and lead to the break-up of most of the world‟s 
States.107 A similar problem can obviously be envisaged regarding the state 
creation procedure in the FDRE Constitution. The signs in Ethiopia‟s SNNPR 
point to that direction. Following the Sidama quest for regional statehood, other 
zonal administrations have reportedly followed suit asking for their own 
regions.    
The demonstration effect does not end there. When the self-determination of 
one ethnic group is viewed as compromising the self-determination of another 
ethnic group, minorities living within the region of that ethnic group could 
strive to achieve self-determination for themselves. This, in turn, creates a 
potential for conflict and/or the creation of pockets or enclaves of administrative 
units that are not viable.     
The risk of boundary-related conflicts should be seen in light of the already 
existing growing incidents of ethnic conflict over identity and territorial issues. 
A proliferation of new states following the ethnic-centered approach enshrined 
in the Constitution might exacerbate this problem. Since the approach denies 
other concerned groups to have a say in the process of state creation, the 
disagreements on the need of creating new states might be manifested in the 
form of territorial disputes. In regions like the SNNPR, with numerous regional 
statehood questions being raised at a time, the capacity of a potentially 
disintegrating regional administration –to solve interethnic disagreements over 
territory– is likely to be limited.   
4.5 Impact of creation of new states in the constitutional amendment 
procedure   
The ethnic-centered approach for the creation of new states in the FDRE 
Constitution has the potential of creating as many regional states as the number 
of ethnic groups in Ethiopia. Although one could think of the possible 
democratic and developmental benefits that could come with the introduction of 
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smaller states –in contrast to the current big regional states,– it cannot be 
ignored that such benefits cannot be distributed in a balanced way throughout 
the country. This is because the Constitution does not as such recognize the 
possibility of creating new states on non-ethnic lines for the purpose of 
administrative efficiency.    
This reality has the potential of giving disproportionate power to smaller 
ethnic groups which create new states in the constitutional amendment 
procedure. This is because, according to Article 105 of the FDRE Constitution, 
for the purpose of amending the provisions of the Constitution in Chapter three, 
the consent of all the State Councils is required. In other words, the more new 
states are created in the federation; the more rigorous the amendment procedure 
would become. Considering the very controversial nature of some of the 
provisions of the Constitution, this does not seem to be desirable. For example, 
a constitutional change that may be desired by over 90% of the population 
might be prevented by a very small region.    
Concluding Remarks    
The procedure for the creation of new regional states in the FDRE Constitution 
is highly ethnic-centered. That is unsurprising considering the Constitution‟s 
provisions that empower every NNP in Ethiopia to have an unconditional right 
to self-determination up to secession. It is this radical stance on self-
determination that has shaped the content and procedure of the right to create 
new regional states in the FDRE Constitution.   
According to Article 47(2) of the FDRE Constitution, every NNP has a right 
to form its own regional state. Once the demand for statehood is approved by a 
two-third majority of the Council of the NNP and presented in writing to the 
State Council, the latter should organize a referendum within one year. If, in the 
referendum, the majority of the concerned NNP votes in support of forming a 
region, the NNP will become a new member of the federation.  
In this procedure, neither the federal government nor concerned regional 
states have substantive role that could affect the outcome of the process. With its 
sole focus on the rights and the interests of the NNP requesting regional 
statehood, the procedure ignores several important concerns. First, the 
constitutional procedure appears to have excluded the possibility of creating 
new states on non-ethnic lines based on considerations of economic and 
administrative efficiency, capacity to perform state functions effectively, or 
requirements of regional planning.108 The apparent absence of a procedure for 
merger also gives the impression that the drafters of the Constitution focused 
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more on possible fragmentation than consolidation. Considering that most of the 
original nine states were multi-ethnic, merger should have been considered as 
one possible expression of the right to self-determination. 
Second, even when the quest for creation of new states comes from an NNP, 
the task of making objective considerations related to economic viability and 
administrative efficiency is left to the ethnic group raising the question. If the 
democratic process within that NNP fails to ensure the proper consideration of 
these concerns, the constitutional procedure does not put any other safeguards. It 
is as if the Constitution considers each ethnic group as a natural economic and 
administrative unit.  
Ethiopia‟s ethnic-centered constitutional approach gives little attention to the 
possible adverse impact of new state creation on the interests of other ethnic 
groups and the Federation as a whole. Of course, even as they pursue their 
legitimate self-interest, the commitment of NNPs of Ethiopia for the well-being 
of other NNPs and the Federation‟s proclaimed goal of building one „political 
community‟ as stated in the preamble of the Constitution can be assumed. 
However, by putting all the trust on the democratic process within the NNP 
demanding statehood, the Constitutional procedure fails to put a mechanism in 
place that prevents state creating endeavors from adversely affecting other 
NNPs or the smooth functioning of the Federation as a whole.  
Agitations for creation of new states are also likely to trigger other similar 
quests. The situation created in the SNNPR following the Sidama quest for 
regional statehood affirmed the demonstration effect of these demands. The 
extent to which the federal system and its institutions can absorb shocks 
emanating from demands for the strict application of the constitutional 
provisions in this area indeed leaves us with many uncertainties.  
This issue is very likely to continue to be a source of an endogenous shock 
that may undermine the healthy functioning of the federal system. One solution 
could be amending the ethnic-centered nature of the process for the creation of 
new regional states by giving the federal legislative organs a substantive role in 
the process as it is the case in several federations. That however requires going 
through the lengthy and cumbersome constitutional amendment procedure. Due 
to the nature of the issue, such an amendment does not also appear possible 
without changing the general ethnic-centered orientation of the FDRE 
Constitution. On top of this, if new regional states are created by following the 
procedure under Article 47, the amendment procedure can practically become 
more rigorous than it is now. Therefore, if the system has to change, 
negotiations for amendment have to be done before the ethnic-centered 
procedure under Article 47 ends up in producing numerous new regions thereby 
making the amendment of not only this provision but also other provisions of 
the Constitution even more difficult.                                                                    ■ 
 
